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circumstantial evidence that the posssessor is the culprit. 81 The fact of
possession is of course relevant and admissible evidence during the trial,
but the jury alone should have the power to determine what weight the fact
should be given in view of the entire evidence presented. There is no
legislative empirical evidence which supports the so-called legal presump-
tion contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes section 432. The legislature
should amend section 432 to describe the possessory concept correctly as
an inference, rather than a legal presumption. Under such an amendment,
the prosecutor would not be required to satisfy the "reasonable doubt"
standard relative to presumed elements, and would still be able to bring the
inference to the attention of the jury, without the benefit of misapplied
terminology to the prejudice of the defendant.
Timothy Jonathan Bradley
CHARACTER AND PRIOR CONDUCT OF THE VICTIM IN SUPPORT
OF A PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE
Charged with murder, the defendant claimed that he shot the de-
ceased in self-defense. Although the defendant introduced evidence indi-
cating that the deceased had attacked him with a knife, the trial court
excluded testimony of prior acts of violence committed by the deceased
against others. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and held that, in a
homicide case, when there is "appreciable evidence" of an overt act or
hostile demonstration on the part of the victim, prior acts of violence by
the victim against others, of which the defendant had knowledge, are
admissible as tending to show the defendant's state of mind. State v. Lee,
331 So. 2d 455 (La. 1976).
When the defendant in a homicide case claims he acted in self-
defense, evidence of the character and background of the victim may be
relevant to two distinct issues: (1) who was the aggressor in the encounter,
and (2) whether the defendant's apprehension of serious bodily harm was
reasonable. Admission of this evidence, however, creates a danger that the
81. E.g., People v. Grimes, 113 Cal. App. 2d 365, 248 P.2d 130 (1952) (unex-
plained possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance tending to show
guilt when coupled with other suspicious circumstances); Drew v. State, 61 Okla.
Crim. 48, 65 P.2d 549 (1937); see Comment, Presumptions and Burdens ofProof, 21
Loy. L. REV. 377, 399-400 (1975).
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jury will improperly empathize with the defendant because of the victim's
undesirable nature. To prevent undue prejudice to the prosecution, the law
imposes a condition precedent to the admissibility of the evidence.' In this
connection section 482 of title 15 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
provides: "In the absence of evidence of hostile demonstration or of overt
act on the part of the person slain or injured, evidence of his dangerous
character or of his threats against accused is not admissible." ' 2 The
prerequisite has been applied whether the evidence is offered for the
purpose of showing who was the aggressor or of showing the defendant's
state of mind to prove the reasonableness of his apprehension.
3
The admissibility of evidence of the victim's dangerous character to
show that he was the aggressor is but one instance of the broader question
concerning the use of character evidence to prove conduct. Although an
individual's character is logically relevant to show the probability of that
person engaging in certain conduct, it is weak evidence and tends to be
given improper weight. Thus, circumstantial use of character evidence is
generally not allowed, 4 but under certain circumstances this rule of exclu-
1. The majority of jurisdictions impose the broad limitation of some other
evidence of deceased's aggression. I J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 11l at 552 (3d ed.
1940) [hereinafter cited as I WIGMORE]; see 2 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 246 at 48 (3d
ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 2 WIGMORE]. For a collection of authorities on this
point see Annot., I A.L.R. 3d 571, 582-89 (1965) and Annot., 98 A.L.R. 2d 6, 78-94
(1964). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, no prerequisite is required
to introduce evidence of the victim's character to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (1975).
2. LA. R.S. 15:482 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 239, § 1. This
note is limited to the application of the statute in homicide cases. Although the
language of the statute is not clear, it was intended apparently to apply only to self-
defense cases. In most crimes against the person the character of the victim is
immaterial since all men, regardless of their character, are entitled to equal protec-
tion of the law. The majority of jurisdictions, however, admit evidence of character
for chastity of a complainant in a rape case when the defendant raises the question
of consent. I WIGMORE, supra note I, § 62 at 464-65. But see LA. R.S. 15:498 (Supp.
1975).
3. See, e.g., State v. Sharpe, 170 La. 69, 127 So. 368 (1930) (evidence offered
to show who was the aggressor); State v. Harris, 131 La. 616, 59 So. 1009 (1912)
(evidence offered to show reasonableness of apprehension). In the early case of
State v. Birdwell, 36 La. Ann. 859, 862 (1884), the court explained, "The rule of
• . .exclusion [in the absence of an overt act] rests on the wise and philosophical
reason that no one is justifiable (sic) in killing a man simply because he is vicious,
quarrelsome or dangerous, or because he has made threats which he manifests no
intention of carrying into effect." For a discussion of the substantive law require-
ment of an overt act as the basis for the necessity to defend, see Comment, Self-
Defense in Louisiana-the Criminal Law and the Tort Law Compared, 16 TUL. L.
REV. 609 (1942).
4. Although there is no general statutory rule of exclusion in the Louisiana
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sion is relaxed. 5 If the prerequisite overt act is shown, Louisiana permits a
defendant to support his plea of self-defense by introducing evidence of
the victim's dangerous character.
6
Allowing character evidence to be introduced raises the further con-
sideration of the permissible method of proving character. There are at
least three logical methods of proof: (1) testimony as to specific acts, (2)
testimony in the form of personal opinion, and (3) testimony as to reputa-
tion. Although testimony of specific acts and personal opinions may better
reveal the actual character of an individual, these types of proof are
thought to involve a greater risk of undue prejudice, confusion of the
issues, and consumption of time.7 Since character evidence offered to
imply conduct is admittedly weak evidence, proof of a person's character
is generally confined to reputation evidence in Louisiana. 8
The relevance of prior threats by the victim against the defendant is
closely associated with the use of the victim's dangerous character to show
Code of Criminal Procedure, LA. R.S. 15:479-83 deal with the permissible uses of
character evidence.
5. A significant exception to the rule of exclusion is that the accused is
allowed to "open the door" to his relevant character traits, and after the accused
has initiated the inquiry into his character, the prosecution is allowed to produce
evidence of bad character in rebuttal. C. MCCORMICK. EVIDENCE § 191 at 454-59
(Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
6. Only relevant character traits of the victim may be shown. See State v.
Rollins, 271 So. 2d 519, 522 (La. 1973) (victim's general moral character irrelevant);
State v. Thompson, 109 La. 296, 299, 33 So. 320, 321 (1903) (victim's character for
honesty not pertinent). The defendant may show the victim's character for violence
under the particular circumstances existing at the time of the affray; for example,
evidence that the victim was a violent person when intoxicated would thus be
admissible. State v. Domingue, 166 La. 859, 861-62, 118 So. 46, 47 (1928) (dictum);
see State v. McMillian, 223 La. 96, 64 So. 2d 856 (1953). When the defendant has
introduced evidence tending to show the victim's dangerous character, the prosecu-
tion may rebut the evidence by showing the victim's peaceful character. State v.
Lejeune, 116 La. 193, 40 So. 632 (1906). Wigmore favored the view that the mere
claim of self-defense entitled the prosecution to introduce evidence of the victim's
character. I WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 63 at 471.
7. MCCORMICK. supra note 5, § 186 at 443. It is questionable whether these
policy considerations warrant the exclusion of opinion testimony where character is
not an ultimate issue in the case. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1986 at 165-67 (3d
ed. 1940). Rule 405(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows both reputation and
opinion testimony where character is admissible to prove conduct.
8. LA. R.S. 15:479 (1950) provides: "Character, whether good or bad, depends
upon the general reputation that a man has among his neighbors, not upon what
particular persons think of him." However, if character is an ultimate issue in the
case (for example, in a defamation case when the statement charged bad character
and the defendant pleads truth), the proof is not limited to reputation evidence.
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who was the aggressor. The victim's expressed declaration of intention
tends to show that such intention was in fact carried out. 9 When character
evidence and prior threats are offered for the limited purpose of showing
the probability of the victim's actions, prior knowledge by the defendant is
immaterial as "[tihe inquiry is one of objective occurrence, not of subjec-
tive belief.' ' 0
Evidence of the character and background of the victim may also be
relevant to show the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension of
serious bodily harm. When the defendant pleads self-defense, his state of
mind at the time of the offense becomes a material issue."' Since an act by
one known to be a violent person may justify a more prompt and decisive
response, circumstances known to the defendant at the time of the affray
are relevant to show the reasonableness of his belief of imminent danger.
In contrast to showing the probability of the victim's aggression, it is the
reputed character of the victim, irrespective of his actual character,' 2 that
is relevant to show the defendant's state of mind. Similarly, whether or not
the threats attributed to the victim were actually made is, for this purpose,
irrelevant if the defendant is shown to have believed that they were
uttered. 13
The Louisiana courts have allowed the defendant to introduce evi-
dence of the victim's reputation for dangerous character and his threats
against the defendant to show the probability of the victim's aggression or
to show the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension of serious
bodily harm.' 4 Evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim was
9. The threats are admissible under the "declarations of mental state" excep-
tion to the rule excluding hearsay. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 295 at 697-701; see
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
10. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 63 at 471.
11. LA. R.S. 14:20 (1950) provides in pertinent part: "A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in
imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing
is necessary to save himself .... ." (emphasis added).
12. For a discussion of the distinction between character and reputation in this
area, see Hale, Some Comments on Character Evidence and Related Topics, 22 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 341, 344-45 (1949).
13. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 247 at 60. If the threats were actually made,
however, they are additionally relevant to show the probability of the victim's
aggression.
14. Early decisions had rejected evidence of the victim's character and threats
where it was not shown to be known to the defendant at the time of the affray,
reasoning that unknown matters could not affect the defendant's apprehension.
E.g., State v. Gregor, 21 La. Ann. 473 (1869). Later cases, however, stated that
such evidence was admissible to show who was the aggressor. E.g., State v.
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repeatedly excluded as an attempt to prove character by particular acts.'5
In determining the admissibility of the tendered evidence, however, the
probative value of the evidence must be evaluated in light of the purpose
for which it is offered. The supreme court's decision in State v. McMil-
lian 16 clearly applied this principle. In support of her claim of self-
defense, the defendant in McMillian offered evidence of the victim's prior
violent attacks upon her. The court held that although the evidence of prior
difficulties between the defendant and the victim was inadmissible to show
who was the aggressor, such acts were admissible to show the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's apprehension of imminent danger.' 7
In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court was confronted with
the issue of whether evidence of the victim's prior conduct against third
persons was admissible in support of a plea of self-defense. Justice Tate,
writing for a divided court, 8 approached the question of admissibility by
examining the two distinct purposes for which evidence of the victim's
character and background may be admissible. Despite the fact that defense
counsel's questions sought to elicit testimony of specific acts of violence
committed by the deceased,' 9 the majority found that the trial court erred
in sustaining the prosecution's objections that the testimony was not
proper proof of character. Logically extending the rationale of McMillian,
the majority held that although the victim's violent acts against the defen-
dant or others might be inadmissible as character evidence, they were
Barksdale, 122 La. 788, 48 So. 264 (1909); State v. Robinson, 52 La. Ann. 616, 622-
23, 27 So. 124, 126 (1900). But see State v. Cox, 218 La. 277, 288, 49 So. 2d 12, 15
(1950) (court stated, "The trial judge held, and rightly so, that: 'An uncom-
municated threat, when no communicated threat has been proven, is so clearly
inadmissible that no citation of authority is necessary.' ").
15. E.g., State v. Williams, 155 La. 9, 98 So. 738 (1924); State v. Fontenot, 50
La. Ann. 537, 23 So. 634 (1898).
16. 223 La. 96, 64 So. 2d 856 (1953), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Evidence, 14 LA. L. REV. 220, 227-28
(1953).
17. Id. at 99-100, 64 So. 2d at 857.
18. Chief Justice Sanders and Justices Marcus and Summers dissented from the
majority opinion on original hearing and rehearing. 331 So. 2d 455, 456 (La. 1976).
19. The questions propounded by defense counsel were extremely broad. For
example, a question asked of a defense witness was: "Did you ever see him [the
victim] do anything physical to anyone?" Id. at 458 n.2. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Summers argued that "no limitations are placed on the response solicited
and the opposing counsel has no way of anticipating the character or relevance of
the replies." Id. at 462-63. The majority admitted that some of the questions "may
have been subject to objection as vague." Id. at 458 n.2. See The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Evidence, 37 LA. L. REV. 575,
576-77 (1977).
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admissible to show the defendant's state of mind since they were known to
him at the time of the offense and there was evidence of an overt act.
20
As originally enacted, 2 1 section 482 codified the prevailing jurispru-
dence which required "proof" of the overt act or hostile demonstration to
the satisfaction of the trial judge before evidence of the victim's dangerous
character or of his threats against the accused was admissible.22 Permitting
the trial court to exclude such evidence in the event it determined the
testimony of an overt act to be incredible served to protect the prosecution
against the defendant's unfounded claim that the victim attacked him.
Chief Justice O'Neill had repeatedly attacked the constitutionality of such
a judicial determination as a usurpation of the jury's function of evaluating
the evidence.23 In 1952, the legislature relaxed the condition precedent to
admissibility by substituting the word "evidence" for "proof."
24
The majority in the instant case found that the trial court committed
error in that it ignored the effect of the 1952 amendment. Admitting that
some of the court's own decisions had erroneously repeated the earlier
'proof'' criterion,2 5 the majority expressly overruled those decisions.2 6
Implementing the policy reflected in the legislative amendment, the ma-
jority held that when there is "appreciable evidence" of an overt act the
20. Apparently the majority assumed that the testimony sought was known to
the defendant as he and the victim were members of a "closely-knit family group"
of transient roof repairers. 331 So. 2d at 460.
21. La. Code Crim. P. art. 482 (1928).
22. The first clear presentation of this issue was in State v. Ford, 37 La. Ann.
443 (1885), wherein the distinction between "proof" and mere "evidence" of an act
was emphasized. The court stated, "In passing on such a question, the trial judge
must of necessity be clothed with the authority to decide whether a proper founda-
tion has been laid for the proffered evidence, and that authority necessarily in-
cludes the discretion to ignore and not consider testimony which his reason refuses
to believe." Id. at 461. Although the doctrine announced in Ford was generally
followed, there were some decisions which suggested that the evidence should be
considered by the jury. E.g., State v. Stockett, 115 La. 743, 39 So. 1000 (1905);
State v. Kellogg, 104 La. 580, 29 So. 285 (1901).
23. Chief Justice O'Niell's numerous dissents severely criticized the court on
this point and on the inconsistencies of its decisions. See, e.g., State v. Sandiford,
149 La. 933, 952-67, 90 So. 261, 267-73 (1921). For a discussion of the Louisiana
overt act doctrine see Note, 2 LA. L. REV. 376 (1940).
24. La. Acts 1952, No. 239, § I.
25. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-
Evidence, 35 LA. L. REV. 525, 529-30 (1975).
26. The decisions which were overruled on this point were: State v. Groves,
311 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975); State v. Weathers, 304 So. 2d 662 (La. 1974); State v.
Mitchell, 290 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974); State v. Foreman, 256 La. 999, 240 So. 2d 736
(1970); State v. Cooper, 249 La. 654, 190 So. 2d 86 (1966); and State v. Knight. 227
La. 739, 80 So. 2d 391 (1955). 331 So. 2d at 460 n.4.
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trial court is stripped of its discretion and the evidence must be evaluated
by the jury.27 The effect of the trial court's withholding of the evidence
was found to have deprived the defendant of the use of important evidence
which may have corroborated his claim of reasonable apprehension of
serious bodily harm.
By its decision, the court has seemingly settled the controversy
concerning the jury's fact-finding function.28 Beyond finding that the
defense had presented "appreciable evidence" in the instant case, 29 how-
ever, the court did not elaborate on what constitutes an "appreciable"
showing. Presumably future cases will clarify the quantum of evidence
necessary.30
By differentiating the purposes for which evidence of the victim's
character and background may be admissible, the majority in Lee estab-
lished a reasoned analytical approach despite the ambiguity of the statute.
The statute makes no distinction concerning the purpose for which the
evidence is offered, nor does it recognize all the conceivable aspects of the
victim's background which may be relevant to substantiate the plea of self-
defense. As Chief Justice Sanders justifiably pointed out in his dissent, it
could plausibly be argued as a matter of statutory interpretation that only
evidence of the victim's reputation for dangerous character and his threats
against the accused is admissible. 3' The majority of the court rejected such
a narrow interpretation.32
27. 331 So. 2d at 459.
28. Although Lee was a 4-3 decision, Chief Justice Sanders and Justice Marcus
did not directly challenge the majority opinion on this point.
29. In the instant case, the first defense witness testified, in direct contradiction
to the prosecution's witnesses, that she saw the victim swing at the defendant with
something and then drop a knife after being shot. The court found that after this
testimony, it could not "be said that there was an 'absence of evidence' of a hostile
demonstration or 'overt act.' " 331 So. 2d at 465.
30. For subsequent applications of the "appreciable evidence" test, see State
v. James, 339 So. 2d 741, 746 (La. 1976) (defendant's "selfserving, contradicted
testimony" that the victim leaned toward a place where the defendant believed he
kept a gun was not "appreciable evidence" of an overt act); and State v. Green, 335
So. 2d 430 (La. 1976) (despite contradiction of defense testimony in a battery case,
court found that foundation had been laid).
31. 331 So. 2d at 466.
32. For an overview of the trend in other jurisdictions toward admitting specif-
ic acts to show the defendant's state of mind, see 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 248 at
62. Rule 404(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with the admissibility of
the victim's character to show conduct and does not purport to deal with the
victim's character as a circumstance bearing on the reasonableness of the defend-
ant's belief. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 21
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Since the jurisprudence recognizes that the defendant's apprehension
may be affected by his knowledge of the victim's dangerous reputation
and prior threats and acts against the defendant, the exclusion of violent
acts against third persons of which the defendant had knowledge would be
logically and constitutionally 33 questionable. Knowledge that a person has
acted violently in the past may have an even greater bearing on the
defendant's belief of danger than his knowledge of the victim's rep-
utation. 34 As indicated by the court, the victim's prior threats against other
persons, if known to the defendant, similarly may be admissible. 35 By
admitting the evidence for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's
state of mind, the traditional rule against proof of character by particular
incidents is not disturbed. Moreover, the objections to the introduction of
specific acts36 are of lesser importance when the inquiry is limited to the
defendant's state of mind, since the reality of the prior act and the victim's
justifications are immaterial. 37
Lee illustrates but one situation where evidence not specifically
covered by the statute may be relevant. As another example, would the
victim's prior violent acts against the defendant of which the defendant
had no knowledge at the time of the affray be admissible? 38 While prior
violent acts against other persons may be of little value to show the
victim's later conduct, 39 it is submitted that prior attempts to seriously
harm the defendant are of sufficient probative value to be admissible. Such
(Supp. 1973). Apparently evidence of specific acts to show the defendant's state of
mind would be admissible under Rule 404(b). Cf. Note, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 266, 278
(1974).
33. The exclusion of this evidence may be a denial of due process since the
defendant is entitled to a fair opportunity to present his defense. Cf. Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
34. Justice Summers objected to the admission of hearsay testimony (331 So.
2d at 462), but when the evidence is offered to show the defendant's state of mind it
is non-hearsay since it is not introduced to show that the matter asserted is true.
35. Id. at 461.
36. See the text at note 7, supra.
37. Wigmore asserted, however, that proof of the objective truth should be
admitted as tending to show the probability of the evidence ever having been
communicated. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 263 at 84-85.
38. For example, if the victim had fired upon the defendant and the defendant
did not know that he had been attacked (or he did not know who had attacked him),
would evidence of that violent act be admissible?
39. Wigmore, however, argued that the considerations which exclude specific
acts to show the defendant's character were of little or no force when the defendant
sought to prove the victim's dangerous character. He favored admitting such
evidence subject to the trial court's discretion to control the number of incidents. I
WIGMORE. supra note 1, § 198 at 676-77.
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evidence, analogous to prior threats, tends to show the victim's violent
propensities toward the defendant.4"
Undoubtedly future cases will raise questions concerning the admissi-
bility of evidence of the victim's character and background which remain
unanswered. It is urged that the court continue its functional interpretation
of the statute and require examination of the probative value of the
evidence in light of the purpose for which it is offered.
Diane L. Crochet
LAND OCCUPIERS' LIABILITY-THE DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE TO ALL
Louisiana, along with all other jurisdictions, long determined the
duty of a land occupier towards those injured on his property by examining
the status of the entrant-either invitee, licensee or trespasser-and found
a separate and distinct duty owed to each class. Recently, the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in two separate decisions, indicated its desire to abandon
these classifications and impose upon the land occupier a single duty of
reasonable care towards all entrants.' In attempting to appraise the impact
of these decisions, two questions must be considered. Does the duty of
"reasonable care" dictate that identical precautions be taken for the safety
of all entrants? If not, how will the facts surrounding the entry affect the
determination of what is "the reasonable care" to which the particular
entrant is entitled? Analyzing the development of the classification system
in Louisiana may help formulate answers.
Long before the development of general negligence principles, Eng-
lish courts established the three classes of entrants, 2 justifying the system
40. This rationale could be extended to admit evidence of the victim's violent
acts against persons closely associated with the defendant-for example, the de-
fendant's family.
1. Shelton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 334 So. 2d 406 (La. 1976); Cates v.
Beauregard Elec. Coop., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976). In both cases, the court
affirmed the decisions of the lower courts although finding it unnecessary to use the
classification system. Two recent circuit court cases have accepted the abandon-
ment of the classification system as the new Louisiana position. Vidrine v. Missouri
Farm Ass'n., 339 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Molaison v. West Bros., 338
So. 2d 726 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
2. Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and
1174 (Vol. 37
